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Abstract 
By the middle of the 2000s an electoral authoritarian regime had been established under Putin, 
and the Kremlin’s “party of power”, United Russia (UR) had emerged as the dominant party. 
Based on the results of Duma and Presidential elections over the period 2003-2016, this article 
examines cross-regional variation in static and dynamic nationalization of voting for UR. The 
main finding is that in the overwhelming majority of Russian regions, a high level of static 
nationalisation is accompanied by a high level of dynamic nationalization. In most of the 
regions, voting for UR rises or falls in a consistent manner across the elections. Some of the 
regions consistently vote in favour of UR whilst another group of regions consistently provides 
UR with poorer results than the national average. Finally, there are some regions which 
consistently vote very close to the national results, reflecting the national trends in voting for 
UR to the greatest degree. Cross-regional variations in both static and dynamic nationalization 
of UR’s support are mostly explained by the degree of authoritarianism in Russian regions.  
Key words: elections, United Russia, cross-regional variations, static and dynamic party 
nationalization.   
 
Introduction 
 
As many scholars have stressed, strong party institutions are vital for the long-term stability 
and healthy functioning of regimes (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1998, Pridham 
and Lewis 1996). One of the key factors of party institutionalisation, which is particularly 
important in federal states, is the “nationalisation” of parties (Caramani 2004, Kasuya and 
Moenius 2008, Jones and Mainwaring 2003, Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola 2009, 
Mustillo, and Mustillo 2012, Golosov 2016). ‘Strongly nationalised party systems are systems 
where the vote share of each party is similar across geographic units (e.g. districts, provinces, 
and regions), while weakly nationalised party systems exhibit large variation in the vote shares 
of parties across sub-national units’ (Kasuya and Moenius, 2008, p. 136).  
Previous studies of party institutionalisation in Russia (Golosov 2015, Turovsky 2016) 
have shown that although cross-regional differences in voting for UR are salient, the party 
system became much more nationalised in the 2000s. This is primarily due to the fact that by 
the mid-2000s the Kremlin’s party of power, United Russia (UR), had emerged as the dominant 
force in the country (see Gel’man 2006, Reuter 2010, Reuter and Remington 2009, Ross 2011). 
Under Putin, a “power vertical” was created which has enabled the Kremlin to bring the main 
elite groups under its control, and an electoral authoritarian regime (Golosov 2011, 2017, 
Kynev 2017, Ross 2011a, Schedler 2002) has been established which has guarantees the victory 
of UR in almost all elections.  
At the same time, it has to be stressed that there are two dimensions of party 
nationalisation (see Morgenstern, Swindle, and Castagnola, 2009, Mustillo, and Mustillo, 
2012); “static nationalisation,” and “dynamic nationalisation.” ‘Static nationalisation measures 
the consistency of a party’s support across a country at a particular point in time. It therefore 
measures the degree to which a party has broad appeal across the nation.’ (Morgenstern et al, 
2009). “Dynamic nationalisation”, by contrast, ‘is concerned with whether a party’s vote in the 
various districts rises or falls in a consistent manner across elections’ and here the stress ‘is on 
the uniformity of ‘‘swings’’ or ‘‘trends’’ in the district vote’ (Ibid.).  
Whilst static nationalization of the voting for UR has been examined by scholars, the 
study of dynamic nationalization has not yet been addressed. In this study, we shall focus on 
both dimension and particularly on the “dynamic” aspect of party nationalisation. The paper 
addresses the following questions: To what extent is static nationalization accompanied by 
dynamic nationalization? Are there cross-regional variations in the dynamic nationalization of 
UR’s support, and if so what explains these differences? Which regions demonstrate stable 
levels of deviations at each election, and which regions demonstrate variations in their levels 
of deviation? Are there differences in the stability of regional deviations between Duma and 
Presidential elections?  
In order to answer these questions we analyse the four Duma elections (2003, 2007, 
2011 and 2016), and the three Presidential elections (2004, 2008, 2012) contested by UR, since 
the party was formed in 2001. The study begins with a brief review of cross-regional 
differences in voting for UR / UR candidates. We examine the scope of cross-regional 
differences and compare the dynamic of the deviations from the national results across the 
regions. Next, we juxtapose the degree and stability of regional deviations in UR’s electoral 
support from the national results. This allows us to divide all the regions into discrete groups, 
which are analysed in detail in the final section. 
Static Nationalisation: The Scope of Cross-Regional Differences in Voting for UR in 
Duma and Presidential Elections 
Russia is one of the largest and most ethnically diverse multinational federations in the world. 
Moreover, the Federation is highly asymmetrical. The current 85 federal subjects vary widely 
in the size of their territories and populations, and their socio-economic status and ethnic 
composition (Ross, 2011). The regional dimension of voting for United Russia has been 
examined by many scholars (Clem 2006; Marsh, Albert and Warhola 2004; Reisinger and 
Moraski 2009; Reisinger and Moraski 2010, Panov and Ross 2013 White 2015; White 2016). 
There are also important regional variations in electoral and party politics and in the types of 
political regimes which operate in the regions, which range from “competitive” to “hegemonic” 
authoritarian (Panov and Ross 2013). As this study will demonstrate, the dominance of UR at 
the national level is accompanied by strong cross-regional variations. Thus, despite the fact 
that UR / UR’s candidates consistently gain a majority in all the regions, the degree of its 
dominance varies greatly. In other word, one can observe significant regional deviations from 
UR’s nationwide results, in both positive and negative directions.  
A review of the most recent literature on regional voting in Russia, demonstrates that 
regions with a larger share of non-Russians and a larger share of rural inhabitants exhibit higher 
levels of support for UR (Panov and Ross 2016; Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi 201; Golosov 2013; 
White 2016). Thus, for example, White in her study of the impact of ethnicity and voting for 
UR has demonstrated that districts with greater proportions of non-Russians were ‘robust 
sources of support’ for United Russia in the Duma elections of 2003–2011. The ethnic republics 
delivered ‘between one-quarter and roughly one-third of United Russia’s votes in each election: 
26.8% in 2003, 25.4% in 2007, and 30.3% percent in 2011’ (White 2015, 525-6). Likewise, 
Reisinger and Moraski found that the strongest explanatory factor for variations in the level of 
electoral support for UR (in Duma and Presidential elections held over the period 1995-2008) 
was, ‘the proportion of the population that is non-Russian, and they concluded that, ‘to a high 
degree the federal leadership’s dominance rests on vote totals provided by the republics and 
autonomous regions’ (2010, 68). 
In order to examine static nationalisation, i.e. regional deviations from the national 
results for UR in separate elections in more detail, we use two sets of data: 1) The regional 
party list results for UR in four Duma elections (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2016) in 83 regions; 2) 
The regional results for UR candidates in three presidential elections (Putin’s victory in 2004 
and 2012; Medvedev’s victory in 2008) in 83 regions. Crimea and Sevastopol’, in addition to 
a small number of ethnic regions which were merged with other regions in the mid-2000s, are 
excluded from our analysis.  
All the absolute values of the deviations of each region from the national results 
(URdevDuma and URdevPres) are presented in the Appendix. We also calculated the sum of 
the modulus of regional deviations in each election. Their values along with the national results 
and the statistics of cross-regional deviations from the national results can be seen in Table 1, 
and Figure 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here]   
In general, one can see (in Table 1) that the range of regional results for UR / UR’s 
candidates was exceptionally high in all the elections, although it was higher in the Duma 
elections (from 50.6% to 70.4%) than in the Presidential elections (between 32.3% and 53%).  
In 2003, the worst result for UR was in Voronezh (25.9%) whilst Chechnya demonstrated the 
highest support for UR (79.8%). Chechnya remains the most successful region for UR in all 
the other Duma elections (99.36% in 2007; 99.48% in 2011; 96.30% in 2016) and also in the 
2012 Presidential elections (99.76% for Putin). In 2004, the highest result for a UR candidate 
was in Ingushetiya (98.18%), and in 2012 – in Dagestan (91.92%). On the other hand, the 
regions where UR / UR’ candidates received the lowest number of votes vary: Nenets AO in 
2007 (48.78%); Yaroslavl in 2011 (29.04%); Altay krai in 2016 (35.20%); Belgorod in 2004 
(54.82%); Smolensk in 2008 (59.26%); Moscow in 2012 (46.76%).  
It is noticeable that the general scope of deviations is fairly stable within each type of 
election, and there is no clear upward / downward trend. The values of the standard deviations 
for the Duma elections fluctuate between 0.111 and 0.169, and for the Presidential elections – 
between 0.084 and 0.103. The sum of modulus of regional deviations in the Duma elections 
increased from 6.2877 in 2003 to 10.9942 in 2011 but then fell to 9.9352. The Presidential 
elections show much more stable values – 5.59; 5.36; 5.96. 
At the same time, there are clear differences in the results for the Duma and Presidential 
elections. The latter demonstrates much lower cross-regional deviations than the former. This 
is not surprising as the results for UR’s candidates in presidential elections are much higher 
than the results for the party in Duma elections. Here it is important to stress that voting patterns 
are different in the two types of elections: Presidential elections are much more personalized, 
and Putin’s personal popularity matters in Presidential elections to a greater extent than in 
Duma elections. 
The Dynamic of  Cross-Regional Deviations in Voting for UR in Duma and Presidential 
Elections  
In order to compare the dynamic of the deviations from the national results between different 
regions, we constructed the indicator - average degree of deviations (averURdevDuma and 
averURdevPres). This is calculated for each of the regions on the basis of the absolute values 
of regional deviations. Its values, which are also displayed in the Appendix, are the sum of 
modulus of the absolute values of regional deviations divided by the number of consecutive 
elections (4 for the Duma and 3 for the Presidential elections). The statistics for these variables 
are displayed in Table 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
It has been found that in general, the values of the average degree of deviations as well 
as cross-regional differences are, as expected, much greater for the Duma elections than in 
Presidential elections, and the scope of the cross-regional deviations is greater for Duma 
elections. The regions with the highest level of deviation in the Duma elections are Chechnya 
(averURdevDuma is 0.424); Mordoviya (0.3504); Kabardino-Balkariya (0.3252); Tuva 
(0.2958), and Ingushetiya (0.2843). The group with the highest levels of deviation in the 
Presidential elections includes almost the same regions: Ingushetiya (averURdevPres is 
0.2554); Chechnya (0.2521); Dagestan (0.2474); Mordoviya (0.2118); Tuva (0.2057). It has to 
be stressed that all these regions have very high positive deviations from the national results. 
In other words, they deliver much higher levels of electoral support to UR than the Russian 
electorate as a whole. 
On the other hand, we have a group of regions with the lowest average deviations. The 
least deviated regions for the Duma elections are; Belgorod (averURdevDuma is 0.0195); 
Stavropol (0.0199); Yakutiya (0.0239); Chuvashiya (0.0287); Rostov (0.0364). It is notable 
that all of these regions are outside the respective group for the Presidential elections, where 
the other group of the regions demonstrates the lowest average deviations: Pskov 
(averURdevPres is 0.0151); Perm (0.0168); Kamchatka (0.0171); Komi (0.0171); Adygeya 
(0.0204). At the same time, most of the least deviated regions in the Duma elections are not 
very far from the top of the least deviated regions in the Presidential elections: Rostov is 15; 
Chuvashiya – 18; Yakutiya – 20; Stavropol – 31 (with the exception of Belgorod which is only 
63). Similarly, the least deviated regions in the Presidential elections have middle positions in 
the list of Duma elections: Kamchatka – 15; Pskov – 32; Komi – 39; Perm – 42; Adygeya – 
50.  
Overall, as can be seen in Figure 2, the values of the average degree of deviations for 
the Duma and Presidential elections to a great extent correlate with each other (the coefficient 
of correlation is 0.884 with 0.01 statistical significance). 
[Figure 2 about here]   
In order to examine, whether social-economic or the political features of the regions 
influence on the average degrees of deviations, we carried out regression analysis using as 
predictors some variables which relate to the main social, economic and political specificities 
of the regions: 
 The level of poverty (average in 2003-2015, weighed to all-Russian values); 
 Share of urban population (average in 2003-2015, weighed to all-Russian values); 
 Share of ethnic Russians in the population of the region (census of 2010); 
 The degree of authoritarianism in the regions, for the measurement of which the share of 
vote for UR (average in 2003-2015, weighed to all-Russian values) was used. 
The results, which are presented in Table 3, demonstrate that the only statistically 
significant predictor is regime-type (which refers to the level of authoritarianism, see 
discussion below) 
[Table 3 about here] 
The results of our regression analysis is also confirmed by the picture on Figure 2: this 
shows that, although the overwhelming majority of the regions demonstrate fairly low values 
of deviation for both the Duma and Presidential elections, there is also a group of regions with 
an exceptionally high degree of deviation from the national results. Such a group is clearly 
represented if we take the value of 0.15 as a conditional threshold between a fairly high and 
fairly low degree of deviation and divide the plane into sections by both horizontal and vertical 
lines according to this value. 7 regions are above the horizontal line and to the right of the 
vertical line: number 11 – Chechnya; 15 – Dagestan; 16 - Ingushetiya; 42 – Mordoviya; 20 - 
Kabardino-Balkariya; 25 - Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; 71 – Tuva. Additionally, four other 
regions are close to this group: 81 - Yamalo-Nenets AO; 7 – Bashkortostan; 68 – Tatarstan; 13 
- Chukotka). Again, we can see that all of the regions with the highest levels of deviation have 
positive deviations: these are the well-known ‘national republics’ with strong authoritarian 
political regimes. In other words, in most cases it is strong regional authoritarianism that 
generates the highest levels of regional deviations in voting for UR / UR’s candidates.  
Dynamic Nationalisation: Stability/Instability of Regional Deviations in Voting for UR in 
Duma and Presidential Elections 
It has to be stressed that the indicator averURdev shows the extent to which a region generally 
deviates from the national value, however it tells us nothing about the stability/instability of 
these deviations, as in order to calculate this indicator we take a modulus of deviations. Thus, 
for example, the same high value of averURdev may appear both in the case of high and very 
stable deviations in one direction and in the case of very unstable deviations, when a region 
deviates from the national results in different directions across several elections. Similarly, the 
value of averURdev may be fairly low even if the results of UR in a region change their 
direction relative to the national values. For instance, in the Duma elections, a region may have 
deviations such as: 2003 = -0.05; 2007 = 0.05; 2011 = -0.05; 2016 = 0.05. Here the value of 
the averURdev would be fairly low = 0.05 in spite of the fact that the values of deviation have 
changed significantly from one election to the next.  
Taking the above factors into account, for the analysis of stability/instability of 
deviations, we calculated another indicator, the average instability of deviations 
(instabURdevDuma and instabURdevPres). In contrast to averURdev, it is based on absolute 
values, not the modulus of the deviations of a region from the national results in all the elections 
(URdevDuma and URdevPres). Here we, 1) calculate the values of change in regional 
deviations from the nationwide results between consecutive elections; 2) we take the modulus 
of change; 3) we calculate the average values of the modulus: the sum of the modulus divided 
by the number of changes (3 on Duma and 2 on Presidential elections). 
The values of the average instability of deviations are displayed in the Appendix; and 
the statistics of these variables are presented in Table 2. Again, one can see that the values of 
the average instability of deviations, as well as cross-regional differences are greater in the 
Duma than in Presidential elections, but to a much lesser extent than the values of the average 
degree of deviations. The most stable deviations in Duma elections are observed in Penza 
(instabURdevDuma is 0.0187); Stavropol (0.0189); Vladimir (0.0196); Kaluga (0.0226), 
Belgorod (0.0257). These are the regions which follow the national pattern of fluctuations in 
voting for UR to a greater extent. On the contrary, Ingushetiya (0.1523), Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya (0.1386); Astrakhan (0.1349); Komi (0.1337), and Bashkortostan (0.1296) 
demonstrate the most unstable deviations from the national results. 
It is interesting that in the Presidential elections Komi appears in the opposite group of 
regions with the most stable deviations (instabURdevPres is 0.0044), coming after the Altay 
Republic (0.0020) and alongside Irkutsk (0.0063); Novosibirsk (0.0067), and the Jewish AO 
(0.0075). Belgorod, on the contrary, shows the most unstable deviations in the Presidential 
elections, appearing just after the 5 top unstable regions – Kirov (0.1172); Moscow (0.1097); 
Marii El (0.1073); Chechnya (0.1019); North Ossetiya (0.1012).  
[Figure 3 about here]   
In general, as can be seen in Figure 3, most regions demonstrate fairly high levels of 
stability of deviations. Both vertical and horizontal lines divide the plane into sections 
according to the value 0.08. The value was chosen rather arbitrary, however it is likely to be 
not very high, and consequently may logically be considered as a conditional threshold. Hence, 
the overwhelming majority of the regions (60 out of 83), which are located on the lower left 
section, have values of average instability lower than 0.08 for both types of election. Only three 
regions (11 – Chechnya; 25 - Karachaevo-Cherkessiya; 43 – Moscow) have values of average 
instability higher than 0.08 for both types of election. 
Interconnection between the Degree and Stability of Regional Deviations of UR’s Support  
We can divide the regions into various groups based on the degree of their deviations (both 
stable and unstable) from the national results. If we take the same threshold as previously, it is 
possible to distinguish regions with ‘normal’ or ‘moderate’ deviations (less than 0.15) and 
‘anomalous’ or ‘abnormal’ deviation (more than 0.15). Also we have to take into account the 
fact that deviations may have a different sign, i.e., be either in favour of UR or against UR. 
Additionally, ‘fluctuating deviations’ when there are neither clear pro nor contra UR trends, 
have to be distinguished. Groups of regions based on these criteria are displayed in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In Figures 4-5, we place all the regions on the plane where the values of instability of 
deviations are marked on the X axis, and the values of the degree of deviations are on the Y 
axis. Both the horizontal and vertical lines are the thresholds of degree (0.15) and stability 
(0.08) of deviations. Analysing the results, we can distinguish three clusters.  
 [Figure 4-5 about here]   
1. The first cluster (11 cases) includes the regions with abnormal deviations (they are 
all located above the horizontal line). Two regions - Chechnya (number 11 in the Appendix) 
and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (25) - demonstrate unstable abnormal deviations in favour of UR 
in all the elections. Two other regions show stable abnormal pro-UR deviations in all the 
elections: Kabardino-Balkariya (20) and Tuva (71). Dagestan (15), Ingushetiya (16), and 
Mordoviya (42) are between these groups, demonstrating unstable abnormal deviations in the 
Duma elections, and stable abnormal deviations in the Presidential elections. Additionally, one 
can see stable abnormal pro-UR deviations in the Duma elections in Kemerovo (27) and 
Tatarstan (68); and in Presidential elections in Bashkortostan (7) and Yamalo-Nenets AO (81).  
It is noticeable, that there are neither regions with abnormal deviations against UR nor 
even fluctuating regions in this cluster. All the regions above the horizontal line on both planes 
are strong pro-UR regions. It has to be stressed that it is their abnormality that generates the 
instability in their deviations from the national results, since they usually provide abnormal 
voting for UR, irrespective of how the country votes as a whole. Thus, for example, the results 
of UR / UR’s candidates in Chechnya was 99.36% (2007), 99.48% (2011), 96.30% (2016), 
92.3% (2004), 88.7% (2008), 99.76% (2012), in spite of the fact that there were significant 
variations in the national results over this time period.  
The existence of this group of regions explains the fairly high degree of correlation 
between the average instability of deviations and the average degree of deviations. The 
correlation coefficients take statistically significant values which achieve 0.457 in the Duma 
elections and 0.241 in the Presidential elections. Strictly speaking, theoretically and logically, 
these two variables should not connect with each other as they reflect different phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, in the context of Russian regional politics such a connection appears. The 
anomalous voting for UR in the most authoritarian regions is grounded in the strong 
administrative pressure which is placed on voters and electoral commissions. To the extent 
which authoritarian rulers exercise strict control over their regional elites, voters, and the 
electoral process in general, the results for UR and its candidates will not depend on voters’ 
preferences. As a consequence, high instability of deviations in UR’s support from the national 
results takes place in these regions. Softer regional regimes are characterized by greater degrees 
of intra-elite competitiveness that leads to weaker administrative pressure. In this context, the 
results of UR and its candidates will depend on voters’ preferences to a much greater extent. 
Here, national election trends matter and thus the level of instability of deviations decreases. 
2. Moving to the right sector below the horizontal line, we can distinguish some groups 
of regions with normal unstable deviations in voting for UR – 12 in the Duma elections 
(excluding number 7 – Bashkortostan which was included in the first cluster) and 8 - in the 
Presidential elections (including Tambov (67) that is very closed to the line). Only two regions 
(Moscow and Tambov) are common for both Duma and Presidential elections, however we 
suggest that high instability of deviations of at least one type of election is sufficient for 
inclusion of the region in this cluster. 
Most of these regions (11 of 18), as we would expect, are characterized by fluctuated 
voting. In other words, they deviate from the national results in favour of UR at some elections, 
whilst at others they deviate in the opposite direction. At the same time, there is a group of 5 
regions which demonstrate completely or almost completely contra-UR unstable deviations: 
Amur (4), Archangelsk (5), Kirov (31), Lipetsk (39), and Moscow (43). Moscow here is the 
most exemplary case of a region with highly unstable deviations. Here support for UR deviates 
from the national results against the party of power (except for the 2008 Presidential elections) 
but the degree of anti-UR voting changes very significantly. As it is well known, for a long 
time Moscow politics was dominated by the ‘political machine’ created by Mayor Luzhkov 
(Brie 2004). In spite of fairly widespread anti-government sentiments of Moscow residents, 
this political machine ensured pro-Kremlin voting in 2003 (the absolute value of deviation was 
closer to the national results: -0.0347); 2004 (-0.0270); 2011 (-0.0267). Nevertheless, in the 
face of a changed political context (the resignation of Luzhkov was a part of this change), the 
results for UR decreased sharply, and the absolute value of deviation was -0.1677 in 2012, and 
-0.1640 in 2016. 
On the other side, two regions – Chukotka (13) and North Ossetiya (48) – show pro-
UR deviations in all the elections but their degree is very unstable. Thus, in Chukotka voting 
for UR in 2003 was much more than the national results (the value of deviation was 0.1683). 
In 2007, the deviation fell slightly (0.1383), in 2011 it increased again, significantly (0.2103) 
but in 2016 it decreased sharply (only 0.0460). North Ossetiya demonstrates similar results. 
3. The overwhelming majority of regions (54 of 83) appear in the last cluster of cases - 
normal and stable deviations in voting for UR (the left sector below the horizontal line). This 
result is in line with our observation, pointed out above, that most of the regions demonstrate 
moderate and fairly stable and consistent deviations from UR’s nationwide results. 
Nevertheless, such stability may have different meanings in different regions. The group of 6 
regions, which normally deviate in favour of UR in all or almost all the elections, can be clearly 
distinguished. Among them, Kalmykiya (22) provides UR with the most support (average 
deviation is 0.1369 in the Duma elections and 0.0532 in the Presidential elections). Adygeya 
(1), Tyumen (73), Saratov (62), and Penza are also very favourable UR regions. Rostov 
deviates from the nationwide results to a much lesser extent (0.0364 and 0.0292) but always in 
favour of UR. 
17 regions show a clear trend which is neither pro nor contra UR. Stavropol (65) is a 
very interesting case, as it is the region that is closest to the national results of UR. Fluctuations 
in voting for UR in Stavropol relative to the national results are very low. Krasnodar (34), 
Buryatiya (10), Udmurtiya (74), Yakutiya (80) have similar results. St. Petersburg (64) is 
another interesting region that demonstrates clear and stable anti-UR voting in Duma elections 
(-0.0577; -0.1397; -0.1394; -0.1450) but loyal voting for UR in Presidential elections (0.0381; 
0.0199; -0.0497). Sverdlovsk Oblast (66), Kareliya (26) are also in accord with such kinds of 
fluctuations. One important causal factor here is the poly-centric structure of the regional elites. 
This is clearly evident in the Duma elections, where bargaining between elite groups is a 
commonplace in these regions. However, Presidential elections are perceived by regional elites 
as an indicator of personal loyalty to the Kremlin. As a result the contradictions between elite 
groups fade into the background during Presidential elections. 
 Finally, the most populated group of regions (31) shows stable deviations against UR 
in all or almost all the elections, although the degree of opposition voting varies between them. 
The most anti-UR regions are Primorsky krai (56), Yaroslavl (82), Altay krai (2). Here we can 
also find many regions of Siberia and Urals: Novosibirsk (50), Irkutsk (17), Krasnoyarsk (35), 
Khakasiya (29), Omsk (51), Orenburg (52), Khabarovsk (28), and Tomsk (69). On the other 
hand, such regions as Chuvashiya (14), Kursk (37), Ulyanovsk (75), Kurgan (36), and Kaluga 
(23) deviate from the nationwide results in all the elections against UR, but the degree of their 
deviation is not very high, thus they can be considered as regions which reflect the national 
trends rather than opposing UR. 
Conclusion 
The main finding of this study is that static nationalization of UR’s support, which takes place 
in the context of Putin’s power vertical, is also accompanied by dynamic nationalization. As 
our research has shown, an overwhelming majority of the Russian regions demonstrate fairly 
high stability of their deviations from nationwide results in both the Duma and Presidential 
elections. Here change in the political context leads to change in UR’s national results and 
leads to change in its regional results. Among those regions which generally follow national 
trends in voting for UR, three groups can be distinguished. The first are the regions which 
consistently vote in favour of UR / UR’s candidates to a greater (Kalmykiya, Adygeya, 
Tyumen) or lesser (Rostov) extent. Three dozen regions (e.g., Primorsky krai, Yaroslavl, Altay 
krai, and so forth) consistently provide UR with poorer results than the average for the country, 
although the degree of their deviations against UR differs. Finally, there are some regions 
(Stavropol, Udmurtiya, Yakutiya) which consistently vote very close to the national results, 
reflecting the national trends in voting for UR to the greatest degree. These results throw new 
light on the levels of stability and instability of regional voting patterns in Russian federal 
elections, and the consolidation of UR’s regional support base.  
At the same time, there still remain important regional variations in both static and 
dynamic nationalization of voting for UR. The analysis shows that these variations are mostly 
explained by the type of authoritarian rule which exists in a particular region. While in some 
‘competitive authoritarian’ regions, genuine competition between political actors is allowed to 
take place, as long as the election results deliver overall victory to the ruling party, in other 
‘hegemonic authoritarian regions’, genuine electoral competition is eliminated completely and 
election results are manipulated in favour of UR. Our study uncovered a group of 11 
‘hegemonic authoritarian’ regimes (Chechnya, Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, Kabardino-
Balkariya, Tuva, Dagestan, Ingushetiya, Mordoviya, Kemerovo, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, 
Yamalo-Nenets AO) where there is no genuine political competition. In these regions we find 
abnormally high levels of support for UR. By exercising strong administrative pressure on 
voters and electoral commissions, the rulers of these regions are able to guarantee the Kremlin 
almost any election result it desires. As a consequence, change in the political context plays 
almost no part in determining the election results for the regions in the hegemonic authoritarian 
group. They do not follow the national trend of support for UR, which explains why these 
regions have the highest levels of deviation, as well as the highest levels of instability of these 
deviations.  
The study also found that whilst the general scope of cross-regional deviations is fairly 
stable for each type of election, at the same time, there are important differences between Duma 
and Presidential elections. Presidential elections are much more personalized, and Putin’s 
personal popularity matters to a greater extent than in Duma elections. As a result, UR’s 
candidates are much more successful than their party in Duma elections. Thus, Presidential 
elections are characterized by a lower range of regional variations in their results for UR, a 
lower average degree of deviations, and higher stability of deviations of individual regions, 
from the nationwide results. 
Finally, our results challenges some of the prevailing views about the nature of central-
local relations in Russia and Putin’s power vertical – the idea that the President is omnipotent 
and the Kremlin can guarantee any election result it requires from any region. Dynamic 
nationalisation primarily means that there is a consistent pattern of support across election 
cycles, but it does not signify what the level of support will be. Our study shows that whilst a 
majority of regions give strong levels of support to Putin and UR there are also group of regions 
which consistently give lower than average votes to the Kremlin. Thus, geography and the 
specific nature of regional politics matters. The centre cannot simply dictate to the regions how 
they should vote. Moreover, to achieve victory in the Duma and Presidential elections, the 
Kremlin has to rely on the ‘inflated’ and largely ‘manufactured’ electoral support it receives 
from the ethnic republics.      
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Table 1. Nationwide results of UR and statistics of regional deviations  
  
UR 
2003 
UR 
2007 
UR 
2011 
UR 
2016 
Putin 
2004 
Medvedev 
2008 
Putin 
2012 
National results 0.3757 0.6430 0.4929 0.5420 0.7131 0.7028 0.6353 
Sum of the 
modulus of 
deviations 
6.2877 6.5204 10.9942 9.9352 5.5853 5.3564 5.9551 
Regional results: statistics  
Minimum 0.259 0.488 0.290 0.352 0.548 0.593 0.468 
Maximum 0.798 0.994 0.995 0.963 0.982 0.919 0.998 
Range 0.539 0.506 0.704 0.611 0.434 0.323 0.530 
Mean  0.387 0.651 0.492 0.514 0.717 0.699 0.644 
Standard error 0.012 0.012 0.019 0.016 0.010 0.009 0.0113 
Standard 
deviation 
0.113 0.111 0.169 0.142 0.091 0.084 0.103 
Variance  0.013 0.012 0.029 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.011 
 
  
Figure 1. Cross-regional deviations from the national results (numbers of the regions are the 
same as in the Appendix) 
 
 
  
Table 2. Statistics of the values of the average degree of deviations and the average instability 
of deviations  
  
averURdev 
Duma 
averURdev 
Pres 
instabURdev 
Duma 
instabURdev 
Pres 
Range 0.4042 0.2403 0.1336 0.1152 
Maximum 0.4240 0.2554 0.1523 0.1172 
Minimum 0.0198 0.0151 0.0187 0.0020 
Mean 0.1016 0.0679 0.0607 0.0438 
Standard error 0.0085 0.0061 0.0033 0.0028 
Standard deviation 0.0777 0.0557 0.0304 0.0256 
Variance  0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Regressions results of aver_modul_URdev_Duma and aver_modul_URdev_Pres 
 Duma Presidential 
B 
( St.Er.) 
Beta B 
( St.Er.) 
Beta 
(Constant) -0.296
*** 
(0.091) 
 -0.094 
(0.067) 
 
poverty_weighed_aver 0.012 
(0,015) 
0.063 0.000 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
share_urban_weighed_aver 0.041 
(0.040) 
0.096 0.004 
(0.029) 
0.012 
share_Rus_2010 -0.009 
(0.036) 
-0.030 -0.045* 
(0.027) 
-0.209 
aver_vote_UR 0.599*** 
(0.083) 
0.820 0.330*** 
(0.061) 
0.630 
R-square 0.662 0.639 
Significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Variables and Sources for Table 3 
Variables  Name  Sources  
Level of poverty 
 
poverty_weighed
_aver 
Calculated by the authors on the basis of:  
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2010 
(Moskva: Rosstat, 2010). Table 5.11; Regiony Rossii: 
Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016 (Moskva: 
Rosstat, 2016). Table 4.16 
Share of urban 
population 
share_urban_weig
hed_aver 
Calculated by the authors on the basis of:  
Regiony Rossii: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2010 
(Moskva: Rosstat, 2010). Table 3.3; Regiony Rossii: 
Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2016 (Moskva: 
Rosstat, 2016). Table 2.3 
Share of ethnic 
Russians  
 
share_Rus_2010 Vserossiiskaya Perepis’ Naseleniya 2010. Table ‘National 
composition of the RF population’, available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/perepis_i
togi1612.htm, accessed 8 March 2017. 
The degree of 
authoritarianism 
aver_vote_UR Calculated by the authors from the information provided on 
the Russian Central Electoral Commission Website 
(http://www.cikf.ru). 
  
Figure 2. Cross-Regional Differences in Average Degree of Deviations in Voting for UR on 
Duma and Presidential Elections (numbers of the regions are the same as in Appendix) 
 
  
Figure 3. Cross-Regional Differences in Average Instability of Deviations in Voting for UR in 
Duma and Presidential Elections (numbers of the regions are the same as in Appendix) 
 
  
Table 4. Groups of Regions Based on Their Voting for UR in Federal Elections 
 Stability of deviations 
Unstable Stable 
 
 
 
 
Degree of 
deviations 
 
Abnormal 
  
Pro-UR 9 regions 
(Chechnya; 
Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya, etc.) 
2 regions 
(Kabardino-Balkariya; 
Tuva) 
Anti-UR No 
 
No 
 
Fluctuated No 
 
No 
 
 
 
Moderate   
Pro-UR 2 regions 
(Chukotka; 
North Ossetiya) 
6 regions 
(Kalmykiya;  
Adygeya, etc.) 
Anti-UR 5 regions 
(Moscow,  
Archangelsk, etc.) 
31 regions 
(Primorsky krai; 
Yaroslavl, etc.) 
Fluctuating 11 regions 17 regions 
(Stavropol,  
Udmurtiya, etc.) 
 
  
 
 
  
Figure 4-5. Cross-Regional Juxtapositions between Degree and Stability of Deviations in 
Voting for UR on Duma and Presidential Elections (numbers of the regions are the same as in 
Appendix) 
 
 
Appendix. Regional deviations from the national results of UR / UR’s candidates in Federal elections  
 
averURd
ev 
Duma 
instabU
R 
devDum
a 
URdev 
2003 
URdev 
2007 
URdev 
2011 
URdev 
2016 
averURd
ev 
Pres 
instabU
R 
devPres 
Putin 
dev2004  
Medvede
v 
dev2008 
Putin 
dev2012 
1 Adygeya         0.0914 0.0566 0.1373 0.0667 0.1092 0.0525 0.0204 0.0332 0.0511 -0.0051 0.0051 
2 Altay krai      0.1218 0.0368 -0.0797 -0.0961 -0.1212 -0.1900 0.0660 0.0499 -0.0367 -0.0993 -0.0620 
3 Altay rep.       0.0644 0.0896 -0.1117 0.0516 0.0404 -0.0539 0.0352 0.0020 0.0372 0.0354 0.0332 
4 Amur       0.0820 0.1082 -0.0527 0.0545 -0.0576 -0.1630 0.0461 0.0308 -0.0644 -0.0666 -0.0073 
5 Archangelsk     0.0875 0.0847 0.0033 -0.0758 -0.1739 -0.0970 0.0502 0.0588 0.0614 -0.0330 -0.0561 
6 Astrakhan       0.0876 0.1349 -0.0587 -0.0629 0.1088 -0.1200 0.0512 0.0517 -0.0523 0.0500 0.0512 
7 Bashkortostan   0.1089 0.1296 0.0133 0.1882 0.2121 0.0220 0.1663 0.0439 0.2047 0.1773 0.1169 
8 Belgorod        0.0198 0.0257 -0.0447 0.0109 0.0187 0.0050 0.0735 0.0904 -0.1649 -0.0132 -0.0423 
9 Bryansk         0.0398 0.0419 -0.0287 -0.0253 0.0083 0.0970 0.0552 0.0477 -0.0774 -0.0846 0.0036 
10 Buryatiya        0.0382 0.0544 -0.0287 0.0129 -0.0027 -0.1086 0.0265 0.0369 -0.0473 0.0056 0.0265 
11 Chechnya 0.4240 0.1013 0.4223 0.3506 0.5019 0.4210 0.2521 0.1019 0.2099 0.1842 0.3623 
12 Chelyabinsk     0.0599 0.0725 -0.0377 -0.0319 0.0099 -0.1600 0.0240 0.0479 -0.0113 -0.0465 0.0141 
13 Chukotka   0.1407 0.0888 0.1683 0.1383 0.2103 0.0460 0.1198 0.0353 0.1593 0.1113 0.0887 
14 Chuvashiya      0.0287 0.0272 -0.0027 -0.0203 -0.0587 -0.0330 0.0307 0.0149 -0.0419 -0.0380 -0.0122 
15 Dagestan        0.3252 0.0938 0.2833 0.2489 0.4215 0.3470 0.2474 0.0465 0.2330 0.2164 0.2929 
16 Ingushetiya      0.2843 0.1523 0.1943 0.3442 0.4167 0.1821 0.2554 0.0625 0.2687 0.2138 0.2838 
17 Irkutsk         0.0979 0.0321 -0.0477 -0.0561 -0.1436 -0.1440 0.0883 0.0063 -0.0935 -0.0904 -0.0810 
18 Ivanovo         0.0712 0.0290 -0.0397 -0.0354 -0.0917 -0.1180 0.0374 0.0243 -0.0410 -0.0536 -0.0176 
19 Jewish AO      0.0423 0.0461 0.0463 0.0192 -0.0118 -0.0920 0.0276 0.0075 -0.0344 -0.0289 -0.0194 
20 Kabardino-
Balkariya    0.3185 0.0584 0.3943 0.3182 0.3262 0.2351 0.1927 0.0554 
0.2518 0.1852 0.1410 
21 Kaliningrad     0.0888 0.0269 -0.0557 -0.0692 -0.1222 -0.1080 0.0688 0.0478 -0.0145 -0.0819 -0.1100 
22 Kalmykiya        0.1369 0.0452 0.1313 0.0840 0.1681 0.1640 0.0532 0.0606 0.0792 0.0128 0.0675 
23 Kaluga          0.0562 0.0226 -0.0247 -0.0265 -0.0887 -0.0850 0.0347 0.0190 -0.0115 -0.0474 -0.0454 
24 Kamchatka    0.0454 0.0606 -0.0257 0.0405 -0.0404 -0.0750 0.0171 0.0211 0.0051 -0.0089 -0.0371 
25 Karachaevo-
Cherkessiya 0.2717 0.1386 0.1203 0.2860 0.4055 0.2750 0.1962 0.0843 
0.1097 0.2007 0.2783 
26 Kareliya         0.1032 0.0583 0.0033 -0.0702 -0.1703 -0.1690 0.0468 0.0550 0.0283 -0.0303 -0.0817 
27 Kemerovo        0.1629 0.0417 0.1453 0.1256 0.1495 0.2310 0.0467 0.0670 0.0020 0.0023 0.1359 
28 Khabarovsk      0.0874 0.0454 -0.0327 -0.0363 -0.1115 -0.1690 0.0678 0.0093 -0.0679 -0.0616 -0.0740 
29 Khakasiya        0.0930 0.0458 -0.0717 -0.0477 -0.0916 -0.1610 0.0829 0.0236 -0.0990 -0.0981 -0.0517 
30 Khanty-Mansi 
AO 0.0507 0.0456 0.0373 0.0165 -0.0828 -0.0660 0.0333 0.0679 
0.0353 -0.0360 0.0286 
31 Kirov           0.1105 0.0384 -0.0467 -0.0892 -0.1439 -0.1620 0.0581 0.1172 -0.0579 0.0601 -0.0563 
32 Komi 0.0818 0.1334 -0.0457 -0.0224 0.0952 -0.1640 0.0171 0.0044 0.0228 0.0146 0.0140 
33 Kostroma        0.1189 0.0534 -0.0347 -0.0795 -0.1855 -0.1760 0.0690 0.0434 -0.0209 -0.0784 -0.1077 
34 Krasnodar       0.0371 0.0432 -0.0047 -0.0241 0.0686 0.0510 0.0295 0.0668 -0.0394 0.0478 0.0013 
35 Krasnoyarsk     0.0942 0.0474 -0.0767 -0.0363 -0.1259 -0.1380 0.0741 0.0379 -0.1100 -0.0781 -0.0343 
36 Kurgan          0.0542 0.0564 -0.0397 0.0013 -0.0488 -0.1270 0.0329 0.0309 -0.0437 -0.0535 -0.0016 
37 Kursk           0.0378 0.0300 -0.0747 -0.0156 -0.0357 -0.0250 0.0506 0.0149 -0.0607 -0.0601 -0.0310 
38 Leningrad 
Oblast 0.0639 0.0928 0.0053 -0.0507 -0.1575 -0.0420 0.0252 0.0373 
0.0579 -0.0009 -0.0168 
39 Lipetsk        0.0564 0.0859 -0.0937 -0.0200 -0.0920 0.0200 0.0489 0.0257 -0.0769 -0.0444 -0.0254 
40 Magadan         0.0750 0.0265 -0.0317 -0.0906 -0.0825 -0.0950 0.0526 0.0302 -0.0126 -0.0721 -0.0731 
41 Marii El         0.0417 0.0565 -0.0297 0.0324 0.0295 -0.0750 0.0484 0.1073 -0.0401 0.0694 -0.0357 
42 Mordoviya        0.3504 0.1159 0.3853 0.2911 0.4233 0.3020 0.2118 0.0172 0.2004 0.2003 0.2346 
43 Moscow          0.0817 0.0930 -0.0347 -0.1015 -0.0267 -0.1640 0.0690 0.1097 -0.0270 0.0124 -0.1677 
44 Moscow Oblast     0.0823 0.0674 -0.0397 -0.0454 -0.1619 -0.0820 0.0237 0.0362 -0.0019 0.0013 -0.0680 
45 Murmansk        0.1007 0.0799 0.0163 -0.0919 -0.1727 -0.1220 0.0381 0.0455 0.0273 -0.0502 -0.0368 
46 Nenets AO   0.1075 0.0636 0.0113 -0.1552 -0.1325 -0.1310 0.0694 0.0829 0.0559 -0.0874 -0.0649 
47 Nizhegorod 
Oblast       0.0447 0.0387 -0.0557 -0.0367 -0.0474 0.0390 0.0470 0.0585 
-0.0543 -0.0844 0.0024 
48 North Ossetiya    0.1203 0.0616 0.0913 0.0748 0.1861 0.1290 0.0981 0.1012 0.1994 0.0307 0.0644 
49 Novgorod        0.0761 0.0495 -0.0047 -0.0117 -0.1471 -0.1410 0.0352 0.0304 0.0043 -0.0447 -0.0565 
50 Novosibirsk     0.1131 0.0470 -0.0867 -0.0523 -0.1545 -0.1590 0.0794 0.0067 -0.0821 -0.0838 -0.0722 
51 Omsk            0.0915 0.0482 -0.0487 -0.0416 -0.0968 -0.1790 0.0652 0.0187 -0.0428 -0.0724 -0.0803 
52 Orenburg        0.1042 0.0583 -0.0997 -0.0399 -0.1440 -0.1330 0.0955 0.0294 -0.1252 -0.0947 -0.0665 
53 Oryol            0.0702 0.0711 0.0703 -0.0445 -0.1030 -0.0630 0.0809 0.0628 -0.0965 -0.0390 -0.1071 
54 Penza           0.0766 0.0187 0.0753 0.0601 0.0701 0.1010 0.0287 0.0413 -0.0675 0.0112 0.0073 
55 Perm            0.0841 0.0564 -0.0687 -0.0224 -0.1301 -0.1150 0.0168 0.0339 0.0144 -0.0298 -0.0061 
56 Primorsky krai      0.1275 0.0287 -0.1007 -0.0943 -0.1630 -0.1520 0.0828 0.0276 -0.1194 -0.0644 -0.0646 
57 Pskov           0.0745 0.0524 -0.0047 -0.0757 -0.1264 -0.0910 0.0151 0.0209 -0.0052 -0.0012 -0.0390 
58 Rostov          0.0364 0.0550 0.0143 0.0760 0.0093 0.0460 0.0292 0.0653 0.0118 0.0666 -0.0092 
59 Ryazan          0.0572 0.0448 -0.0587 -0.0720 -0.0950 0.0030 0.0506 0.0850 0.0191 -0.0946 -0.0383 
60 Sakhalin        0.0625 0.0453 -0.0747 -0.0134 -0.0738 -0.0880 0.0564 0.0217 -0.0290 -0.0676 -0.0725 
61 Samara          0.0663 0.0382 -0.0497 -0.0822 -0.0992 -0.0340 0.0641 0.0152 -0.0803 -0.0620 -0.0500 
62 Saratov         0.0921 0.0764 0.0673 0.0051 0.1560 0.1400 0.0428 0.0375 -0.0052 0.0534 0.0697 
63 Smolensk        0.0745 0.0658 -0.0027 -0.1038 -0.1306 -0.0610 0.0809 0.0439 -0.0640 -0.1102 -0.0685 
64 St Petersburg 0.1205 0.0293 -0.0577 -0.1397 -0.1394 -0.1450 0.0359 0.0439 0.0381 0.0199 -0.0497 
65 Stavropol       0.0199 0.0189 -0.0557 -0.0210 -0.0018 0.0010 0.0439 0.0383 -0.0677 -0.0549 0.0090 
66 Sverdlovsk 
Oblast       0.0900 0.0614 -0.0347 -0.0226 -0.1658 -0.1370 0.0243 0.0429 
0.0503 -0.0130 0.0095 
67 Tambov          0.0994 0.1134 -0.0857 -0.0451 0.1737 0.0930 0.0602 0.0791 -0.0769 0.0223 0.0812 
68 Tatarstan       0.2459 0.0650 0.2193 0.1677 0.2854 0.3110 0.1312 0.0625 0.1127 0.0896 0.1914 
69 Tomsk           0.0869 0.0331 -0.0357 -0.0589 -0.1178 -0.1350 0.0560 0.0116 -0.0416 -0.0616 -0.0648 
70 Tula            0.0587 0.1098 -0.0767 -0.0258 0.1203 -0.0120 0.0415 0.0498 -0.0581 -0.0248 0.0415 
71 Tuva            0.2958 0.0781 0.2923 0.2470 0.3600 0.2840 0.2057 0.0512 0.1622 0.1904 0.2646 
72 Tver            0.0693 0.0314 -0.0307 -0.0459 -0.1085 -0.0920 0.0299 0.0241 -0.0072 -0.0271 -0.0554 
73 Tyumen           0.0963 0.0508 0.1213 0.0927 0.1292 0.0420 0.0680 0.0361 0.0228 0.0860 0.0951 
74 Udmurtiya        0.0404 0.0308 0.0453 -0.0373 -0.0420 -0.0370 0.0235 0.0325 0.0466 0.0018 0.0221 
75 Ulyanovsk       0.0424 0.0440 -0.0357 0.0194 -0.0573 -0.0570 0.0471 0.0204 -0.0540 -0.0335 -0.0538 
76 Vladimir        0.0869 0.0196 -0.0717 -0.0755 -0.1102 -0.0900 0.0626 0.0379 -0.0248 -0.0623 -0.1006 
77 Volgograd       0.0816 0.0652 -0.0867 -0.0656 -0.1381 -0.0360 0.0549 0.0406 -0.0828 -0.0801 -0.0016 
78 Vologda         0.0951 0.0611 0.0133 -0.0383 -0.1589 -0.1700 0.0341 0.0430 0.0446 -0.0164 -0.0414 
79 Voronezh        0.0607 0.0539 -0.1167 -0.0733 0.0076 0.0450 0.0409 0.0190 -0.0603 -0.0401 -0.0222 
80 Yakutiya          0.0239 0.0316 0.0133 -0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0780 0.0331 0.0466 -0.0155 -0.0250 0.0588 
81 Yamalo-Nenets 
AO  0.1464 0.0788 0.0823 0.1505 0.2239 0.1290 0.1591 0.0389 
0.1319 0.1358 0.2097 
82 Yaroslavl       0.1229 0.0758 -0.0197 -0.1113 -0.2025 -0.1580 0.0542 0.0428 -0.0050 -0.0670 -0.0905 
83 Zabaikal’skii 
krai           0.0560 0.0494 0.0053 -0.0155 -0.0601 -0.1430 0.0259 0.0611 
0.0118 -0.0447 0.0211 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from official website of the Central Election Commission: http://www.cikrf.ru (last accessed 21 March 
2017). 
